



Security

AIR BASE DEFENSE

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This instruction implements AFPD 31-3, *Air Base Defense*. It provides guidance for air base defense (ABD) during the transition to war and contingency operations. Use it with Joint Pub 3-10, *Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations*, February 26, 1993, and Joint Pub 3-10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense*, March 15, 1993. Related directives and instructions include AFPD 31-1, *Physical Security*; AFPD 31-2, *Law Enforcement*; AFI 31-301, *Air Force Physical Security Program*; AFI 31-201, *Security Police Standards and Procedures*; AFH 31-302, *Air Base Defense Collective Skills*; and AFH 31-305, *Security Police Deployment Planning*. See attachment 1 for abbreviations and acronyms used in this instruction.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This revision corrects paragraph 3.2. The ★ indicates revised material.

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Chapter 1**AIR BASE DEFENSE MISSION**

1.1. Mission. ABD forces must maintain a secure environment by detecting and engaging enemy forces that threaten sustained air operations. These forces must be organized to prevent and defeat attacks rather than to react passively. They must be integrated into rear security operations with other services, host nation (HN), and allied forces. Security police forces must also be prepared to support peacetime contingency operations.

1.1.1. Defending US Air Force resources is the responsibility of all air base personnel. US Air Force personnel who are armed and trained (for example, Prime Beef, Prime Ribs, combat communications units, and selectively armed personnel) must take an active part in ABD. Senior Air Force commanders at each base must carefully consider selective arming and augmentation programs. If the threat requires more armed personnel than are already in place, commanders must plan for time-phased, force deployment list (TPFDL) reinforcements.

1.1.2. The senior Air Force commander organizes, plans, trains, and equips ABD forces. The commander improves ABD as necessary by arranging additional support from other US Service and HN support forces.

1.2. The Threat. Current and accurate threat information is vital for planning ABD operations. Threats to air bases are grouped into three levels, each denoting a responsibility for action. The enemy may use one or all of these to attack air bases. ABD forces must be capable of reacting to nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare during all threat levels, to ensure successful sortie generation.

1.2.1. Level I includes small-scale threats conducted by agents, sympathizers, and partisans, and agent-supervised or independently initiated terrorist activities. Level I threats must be defeated by ABD forces.

1.2.2. Level II includes long-range reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and sabotage operations conducted by special purpose forces, guerrilla forces, unconventional forces, or small tactical units. Level II threats must be defeated or delayed until assistance comes from response forces, usually US Army Military Police units assigned to area commands with supporting fire.

1.2.3. Level III threats include major attacks by aircraft and theater missiles armed with conventional weapons or NBC weapons, in addition to major ground attacks. Level III threats may require timely assistance from a response force (RF) or a tactical combat force (TCF); however, ABD forces must be able to delay ground-based threats.

1.3. Theaters of Operation. ABD operations are needed everywhere from mature theaters to austere regions. Air Force leadership must be able to adapt to a variety of ABD requirements.

1.3.1. A mature theater is an area where ABD operations are conducted on existing main operating bases (MOB) or host nation (HN) bases called collocated operating bases (COB).

1.3.2. An austere region is an area where ABD forces may deploy to sites without existing US Air Force or HN facilities.

1.3.3. Rear areas of a theater are areas that assist in providing freedom of action and continuity of operations, logistics, and command and control. Rear areas may be limited in land mass or may encompass several national boundaries. They are vulnerable to a variety of enemy weapons systems, special operations forces, and surveillance systems. Numerous other units and support facilities that contribute to sustained sortie operations may be targeted and must be defended.

1.4. Joint Operations for ABD. Most future conflicts will be a joint or coalition campaign. Joint or combined campaigns are the integrated military activities of two or more service components- Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. MAJCOMs and units should refer to Joint Publication 3-10, *Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations*, and Joint Publication 3-10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense*, for guidance on conducting ABD in a joint or combined rear area. The primary mission of a joint operation is to sustain the campaign and major operations of the joint force. Joint operational functions include security, communications, intelligence, sustainment, area management, movements, infrastructure development, and HN support. Joint Publication O-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, provides additional references.

1.5. HN Support. The joint forces commander (JFC) normally establishes a single office to serve as the executive agent to manage and coordinate HN support for ABD. MAJCOMs and deployed units use this office to resolve conflicts when seeking HN support. Air Force senior commanders must actively solicit HN support. Component commanders are responsible for the use and employment of HN support IAW JFC directions and guidelines.

Chapter 2

RESPONSIBILITIES

Section A—General Responsibilities

2.1. Chief of Security Police (HQ USAF/SP): 1) Is the approval authority for ABD policy, 2) Plans, develops, and monitors all US Air Force ABD programs, 3) Serves as office of collateral responsibility with HQ USAF/XO in developing regulatory requirements for US Air Force arming policies, 4) Coordinates with HQ USAF/XOXW on theater operational plan (OPLAN) Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) development to ensure consistency with ABD doctrine, 5) Manages distribution of ABD equipment, weaponry, and vehicles received through central procurement, and 6) Manages the ABD program objective memorandum (POM) funding process.

2.1.1. Headquarters Air Force Security Police Agency (HQ AFSPA):

2.1.1.1. Plans, develops, and reviews programs concerning ABD training, employing Resource Augmentation Duty Program (READY) augmentees, and selectively armed owner or user personnel in support of ABD.

2.1.1.2. Reviews ABD training requirements and recommends curriculum changes.

2.1.1.3. Coordinates with supporting MAJCOM/SP staffs for wartime deployment of ABD forces.

2.1.1.4. Monitors SP participation in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises.

2.2. Air Force Intelligence (HQ USAF/IN). Provides guidance for Air Force intelligence support to ABD operations.

2.3. MAJCOM/IN:

2.3.1. Ensures the Defense Force Commander (DFC) receives real-time combat information and intelligence data about enemy forces in their tactical area of responsibility (TAOR).

2.3.2. Upon request, reviews other ABD threat estimates, special subject summaries, and related reports.

2.3.3. Collects and processes all source intelligence to help commanders during wartime and contingencies.

2.3.4. Plans, programs, and budgets for intelligence resources necessary to support air base operations.

- 2.3.5. Provides theater-specific intelligence training and materials to unit personnel to support ABO.
- 2.3.6. Develops a command intelligence estimate for ABD planning and provides it and other ABO related threat materials to units.

2.4. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI):

- 2.4.1. AFOSI provides counterintelligence activities to include collection/production of information concerning foreign intelligence, investigations of terrorism, sabotage, and related acts, offensive operations against foreign intelligence services, and anti-terrorism services.
- 2.4.2. AFOSI provides the DFC counterintelligence (CI) information within the ABD TAOR as well as establishing an effective liaison with host nation intelligence, security, and law enforcement sources.
- 2.4.3. AFOSI must also maintain the capability to respond to criminal activities.
- 2.4.4. AFOSI operations are most effective against Level I and II threats.

2.5. HQ Air Force Material Command (HQ AFMC). Through the Air Base Systems Branch, explores new technologies and conducts research, development, acquisition, testing, and evaluation on new systems for ABD.

2.6. The National Guard Bureau (NGB):

- 2.6.1. Organizes, trains, and equips their SP units for wartime duties in coordination with the gaining MAJCOM/SP and HQ USAF/SP.
- 2.6.2. Ensures that each Air National Guard (ANG) SP unit completes ground combat skills (GCS) training at least every 4 years, preferably every 3 years.

2.7. HQ Air Force Reserve (HQ AFRES):

- 2.7.1. Organizes, trains, and equips their SP units for wartime duties in coordination with the gaining MAJCOM/SP and HQ USAF/SP.
- 2.7.2. Ensures each Air Force Reserve (AFRES) SP unit completes GCS training at least every 4 years, preferably every 3 years.

2.8. HQ Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC). Develops, operates, and maintains initial SP training programs in coordination with HQ USAF/SP. Refer to chapter 3 for training requirements.

2.9. MAJCOM Chiefs or Directors of Security Police:

- 2.9.1. Organize, train, equip, and maintain ABD elements according to this instruction, AFMAN 10-401, *Operation Plan and Concept Plan Development and Implementation*, AFH 31-305, *Security Police Deployment Planning*, and other planning documents.
- 2.9.2. Manage the manpower, equipment, and performance of assigned unit type codes (UTC).
- 2.9.3. Prepare plans and documents for getting necessary ABD equipment.
- 2.9.4. Establish sustainment training standards and advise subordinate units on ABD skills training.
- 2.9.5. Make recommendations to HQ USAF/SPO on policies concerning organizing, training, and equipping deployable SP UTCs.
- 2.9.6. Manage command SP participation in HQ USAF, MAJCOM, and JCS exercises.
- 2.9.7. Complete and forward RCS: HAF-SP(SA)9378 report AF Form 3594, *Security Police Equipment and Manning Report*, or applicable Security Police Automated Systems data base, following the guidance in attachment 2.

2.10. Supported MAJCOMs:

- 2.10.1. Develop TPFDD requirements to support theater OPLANs and CONPLANs.
- 2.10.2. Ensure sustaining munitions quantities are consistent with authorizations and SP forces, including in-place and continental United States (CONUS) augmentation forces projected for deployment.
- 2.10.3. Identify equipment and resupply procedures for the deploying units in OPLANs that contain requirements for SP units.
- 2.10.4. Establish subsistence requirements with Headquarters Defense Commissary Agency to support theater taskings.
- 2.10.5. Advise supporting commands of requirements unique to the particular theater such as 40mm munitions mix for fighting load, unique vehicle or equipment needs, etc.
- 2.10.6. Identify vehicle requirements for prepositioning and update requirements in TPFDDs.
- 2.10.7. Provide after-action reports (AAR) for all mobility deployments and subsequent rotation or replacement units to HQ AFSPA/SPSD. Prepare reports using the specific formats and content information available in AFP 102-2, Volume I, *Joint User Handbook for Message Text Formats*, and as supplemented by AFMAN 10-206, *Operational Reporting*. When AFP

102-2, Volume I, does not contain specific format for the report, use the general administration format with the report's name as the SUBJECT.

2.11. Supporting MAJCOMs: 1) Apply the guidance in War and Mobilization Plan (WMP) -1, Annex T, to maximize the number of active-duty personnel available for wartime deployment and make optimal use of augmentation and selectively armed personnel, 2) Organize, train, equip, and maintain the deployable units reported in WMP-3, Part 2, 3) Ensure UTCs from active and reserve components are deployable within the designed operational capability (DOC) time, 4) Develop budget, requisition, and accounting procedures for required weapons, munitions, equipment, and subsistence, 5) Include procedures for deploying WMP-3 committed units in command mobility planning documents, 6) Maintain a deployment data base for use in time-critical directed deployments, and 7) Provide AARs to HQ AFSPA/SPSD for all mobility deployments and subsequent rotations or replacement units.

2.11.1. Provide additional personnel to CONUS bases (if necessary) from other bases in the command when all OPLAN deployment requirements are satisfied. Before using extra personnel from other bases, consider using personnel in the local base READY program and selectively armed owner or user personnel to fill shortfalls. In all cases, coordinate plans to deploy personnel from other bases with the MAJCOM personnel staff.

2.12. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command. In coordination with HQ USAF/SP and HQ USAF/XOXD, is the executive agent for developing and revising joint (Army and Air Force) ABD doctrine.

2.13. Base Tenant Units. Provide any support necessary for ABD. Support may include the selective arming of owner or user personnel to defend people and resources in their immediate work areas and the augmentation of other ABD forces.

2.14. Security Police Unit Commanders:

2.14.1. Ensure all security police personnel are trained and proficient in individual GCS IAW STP 21-1-SMCT, *Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Level 1*.

2.14.2. Ensure each UTC participates in an ABD exercise at home-station at least once a year. Collective skills guidance is outlined in AFH 31-302, *Air Base Defense Collective Skills*. A MAJCOM training center or joint regional training center (JRTC) deployment will satisfy this requirement.

2.14.3. Ensure assigned Individual Mobilization Augmentees receive GCS sustainment training.

2.14.4. Ensure tasked UTCs prepare and maintain current deployment folders for use in home station training, to include country data, maps, photos, threat estimates (IN/OSI), and rules of engagement.

2.15. Defense Force Commander (DFC):

2.15.1. The senior Air Force commander responsible for the air base normally delegates operational authority to conduct ABD to the DFC. The DFC's staff typically consists of a headquarters (HQ) administrative branch (S1), a combat information section (S2), an operations branch (S3), and a logistics branch (S4).

2.15.2. The DFC:

2.15.2.1. Establishes a base defense operations center (BDOC) that serves as the focal point for ABD and security.

2.15.2.2. Plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all ABD efforts through the BDOC staff.

2.15.2.3. Coordinates ABD issues and requests for assistance with the rear area operations center (RAOC) or rear tactical operations center (RTOC).

2.15.2.4. Submits situation reports through WOC.

2.15.2.5. Disseminates rules of engagement to all ABD forces.

2.15.3. If possible, the DFC exchanges liaison representatives with other US, HN, and allied forces within the area of operation. If this is not possible, the DFC must communicate closely with the RAOC, RTOC or other command and control elements of friendly forces.

Section B—Responsibilities for Communications

2.16. ABD Communications Support:

2.16.1. SP units preparing for ABD operations need certain items for secure communications, which may be requested through their communications security manager: 1) Cryptological material, 2) Signal Operating Instructions (SOIs), 3) Voice call signs, 4) Procedural guidance on accounting, maintenance, and operational use of communications security material.

2.16.2. HQ USAF/SC coordinates and provides communications expertise to HQ USAF/SP, other Air Staff, and MAJCOM/SCs on communications issues and helps HQ AFMC with logistical support for communications-computer systems.

2.16.3. HQ USAF/SP and MAJCOM/SP coordinates procurement of communications equipment for ABD and CONUS mobility forces with HQ USAF/SC or the respective MAJCOM/SC.

2.16.3.1. MAJCOM/SPs plan and request frequency authorizations. They ensure SP units tasked with a mobility or in-place ABD mission provide a list of all communications equipment to the local and MAJCOM/SC communications unit. This list includes authorized equipment, items on hand, and items on order. Local communications units then organize the necessary maintenance support.

2.16.4. Both supporting and supported commands provide wartime maintenance support for ABD communications and electronics equipment at deployed locations. Communications repair personnel maintain this equipment and:

2.16.4.1. Plan for setting up and redeploying communications-electronics equipment at the deployment site.

2.16.4.2. Ensure communications maintenance UTCs are fully trained and supplied with bench test equipment they would need to maintain SP ABD tactical ground communications equipment.

2.16.4.3. Identify and plan for surge communications requirements according to theater planning.

2.16.4.4. Ensure essential communications and computer systems have established local maintenance.

2.16.5. During peacetime, ground combat radio systems are maintained by the base-level communications unit or through contract services. During wartime and contingency deployments, deployable communications UTCs (6KMQ8) or in-place supported command communications personnel maintain the radio systems.

Chapter 3

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

3.1. The Air Force Security Police Academy. The SP Academy includes GCS training as a permanent part of the curriculum for entry and career progression. All SP personnel must complete the appropriate resident entry level GCS course upon accession into the law enforcement, security, and SP officer Air Force specialties. Additionally, career development courses for enlisted 5 and 7 level training include GCS material.

★3.2. Personnel Assigned to UTCs. These personnel must complete training as follows:

1) Individuals, captain through colonel and senior NCOs in ranks of master sergeant through chief master sergeant, assigned to an SP headquarters element UTC (QFEBA or QFEBB) must complete the ABD command course. This course is recommended for all other SP officers in the ranks of captain through colonel and senior noncommissioned officers in ranks of master sergeant through chief master sergeant, 2) Individuals in the grades of sergeant through master sergeant assigned to a UTC must complete the GCS level II course. This course is recommended for all other SP enlisted personnel in the ranks of sergeant through master sergeant, 3) All personnel must receive and maintain weapons qualification IAW AFM 36-2227, *Combat Arms Training and Maintenance Program*.

3.2.1. Each UTC must attend a MAJCOM level training squadron or flight, JRTC or JCS exercise at least every 3 years, preferably every 2 years.

Chapter 4

ABD OPERATIONS

4.1. Planning for ABD. ABD planners must know the strategic intelligence and threats for their expected area of operation. The *ABO Threat Support Document Worldwide Threat to Air Bases: 1991-2001 (U)* is a source for this information.

4.1.1. Plans must address the ground order of battle for each threat level. Focus on expected enemy force capabilities and ensure the ABD plan (format in AFMAN 10-401) details how to fight and defeat enemies with those capabilities.

4.1.2. The plan must:

4.1.2.1. Describe the enemy, friendly situations, and the ABD force organization.

4.1.2.2. Outline the mission of the ABD force, DFC's concept of operation, logistics and administrative support, and appropriate command and signal information.

4.1.2.3. Outline the responsibilities of other US Air Force, Department of Defense (DoD), allied, or HN forces available for ABD.

4.1.2.4. Tell how the SP force makes the transition from peacetime to wartime ABD operations.

4.1.2.5. Address how selectively armed owner or user security integrates into ABD during the transition.

4.1.2.6. Outline and assign areas of responsibility for ABD.

4.2. The Theater Combatant Commander:

- 4.2.1. Oversees all joint rear area (JRA) operations.
- 4.2.2. Assigns responsibilities for defending the JRA and establishes the command or coordination method.
- 4.2.3. Exercises command authority or operational control over all theater joint forces.
- 4.2.4. Designates which service will provide external forces for each air base.
- 4.2.5. Defines the command and control relationship between subordinate area commanders and air base commanders.
- 4.2.6. Defines each base TAOR.
- 4.2.7. Establishes theater rules of engagement based upon guidance from the national command authorities through the Chairman of the JCS.
- 4.2.8. Appoints a JRA coordinator (JRAC) who establishes a joint rear tactical operations center, using joint force staff personnel and representatives from components operating in the JRA.

4.3. Standardizing Employment. To ensure standardized employment, procedures, concepts, and tactics, units involved in ABD operations follow the guidance in AFH 31-302, *Air Base Defense Collective Skills*.

4.4. Conducting ABD Operations. Successful ABD depends on a clear division of terrain responsibility and the sound application of the five principles of defense: 1) Aggressive defense, 2) Defense-in-depth, 3) All-around defense, 4) Integrated defense, and 5) Defense organized around key terrain and vital resources.

4.4.1. Analyzing the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and time available (METT-T) enables ABD forces to mount the most effective defense.

4.4.2. The DFC organizes forces to defeat level I threats and delay level II or level III threats. When a threat exceeds the ABD force capabilities, the BDOC notifies the echelon RAOC or RTOC, which coordinates the employment of an RF or a TCF as outlined in Joint Publication 3.10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense*.

4.4.3. If an air threat exists to US Air Force MOBs, COBs, or bare bases, air defense assets will normally be assigned. Ensure any assigned air defense assets are incorporated into the overall ABD plan.

4.5. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

Operations outside the purview of war are considered MOOTW. MOOTW may include, but are not limited to, support to US, state, and local governments, disaster relief, nation assistance, drug interdiction, peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuation, and peace enforcement.

MOOTW may not be peaceful actions, may be of long duration, and typically have strict rules of engagement. The complexity of MOOTW requires flexible planning and leadership.

4.6. Prisoners of War. The US Army is the lead agent in preparing for, receiving, processing, and transferring enemy prisoners of war (EPW).

4.6.1. The US Air Force is responsible for EPWs under its control until they are released to the Army. All persons captured will be treated as EPWs until their true status is determined. This includes initial processing, interim detention, medical treatment, and transfer to U.S. Army or appropriate host nation authorities. Principals of handling EPWs include firm control, humane treatment, accountability and minimum field processing. Field processing includes search, segregate, silence, speed to the rear, and safeguard.

4.6.2. Properly tag and secure the individual, associated documents, and equipment until they can be transferred to the Army. Notify the servicing AFOSI unit upon seizure of documentation to ensure timely counterintelligence evaluation and analysis. The circumstances surrounding the capture must also be documented.

Chapter 5

MOBILITY, EXERCISES, AND INSPECTIONS

5.1. SP Mobility. Commanders at all levels must clearly and realistically project their wartime manpower requirements and assign each active duty and air reserve force SP unit a wartime mission that is consistent with the guidance in the USAF WMP-1, annex T.

5.1.1. Several factors determine the number and type of deployable units maintained by CONUS commanders: 1) Defense requirements at deployment destinations, 2) Peacetime manpower authorizations at CONUS base, 3) Extent of CONUS wartime sustaining requirements, 4) Fiscal restraints, 5) Training limitations, and 6) Use of augmentation manpower resources.

5.1.2. Deployable SP units are initially limited to those reported in the USAF WMP-3, part 2. HQ USAF/SP, in concert with supported and supporting MAJCOMs direct training and equipping of replacement forces.

5.2. Exercises to Test ABD. Exercises that test the capability of US Air Force personnel to deploy to forward operating locations should also test ABD. When possible, MAJCOMs should incorporate ABD participation in US Air Force or joint service exercises. Provide exercise objectives and AARs to HQ AFSPA/SPSD not later than 30 calendar days following any exercise or real-world deployment. Information in the AAR will be integrated into the Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System to provide lessons learned and assist in the development of force planning. Prepare reports using the specific formats and content information available in AFP 102-2, Volume I, *Joint User Handbook for Message Text Formats*, and as supplemented by AFMAN 10-206, *Operational Reporting*. When AFP 102-2, Volume I, does not contain specific format for the report, use the General Administration format with the report's name as the SUBJECT.

5.3. Evaluations and Inspections. During local or higher headquarters evaluations and inspections, determine the readiness of SP units as reported in WMP-3, part 2. Review the training for personnel assigned to deployable units and the availability of required weapons, munitions, and equipment. Correct any deficiencies reported.

5.4. Forms Prescribed. AF Form 3594, Security Police Equipment and Manning Report.

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Chief of Security Police

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS***Abbreviations and Acronyms***

ABD–Air Base Defense
ABO–Air Base Operability
AETC–Air Education and Training Command
AFMC–Air Force Materiel Command
AFOSI–Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFRES–Air Force Reserves
AFSPA–Air Force Security Police Agency
ANG–Air National Guard
BDOC–Base Defense Operations Center
COB–Collocated Operating Base
CONPLAN–Operation Plan in Concept Format
CONUS–Continental United States
DFC–Defense Force Commander
DOC–Designed Operational Capability
DoD–Department of Defense
EPW–Enemy Prisoner of War
GCS–Ground Combat Skills
HN–Host Nation
IN–Intelligence
JCS–Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC–Joint Force Commander
JRA–Joint Rear Area
JRAC–Joint Rear Area Coordinator
JRTC–Joint Regional Training Center
JTTP–Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
MAJCOM–Major Commands
MOB–Main Operating Base
MOOTW–Military Operations Other than War
MTC–MAJCOM Training Center
NBC–Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NCO–Noncommissioned Officer
NGB–National Guard Bureau
OPCON–Operational Control
OPLAN–Operation Plan
POM–Program Objective Memorandum
READY–Resource Augmentation Duty Program
RF–Response Force
RAOC–Rear Area Operations Center
RTOC–Rear Tactical Operations Center
S1–HQ Administration Branch
S2–Combat Information Section
S3–Operations Branch
S4–Logistics Branch
SP–Security Police
TAOR–Tactical Area of Responsibility
TCF–Tactical Combat Force
TPFDD–Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
UTC–Unit Type Code
WMP–War and Mobilization Plan

SECURITY POLICE EQUIPMENT AND MANNING REPORT (AF FORM 3594)

A2.1. MAJCOM/SPs get management information data from SP units within their command on 31 December and 30 June of each year. This data informs program management decisions for time-critical taskings in planned and unplanned contingencies. Use AF Form 3594 to report this information to HQ USAF/SPX.

A2.2. Reporting continues during emergency conditions using emergency status code C-2, Normal. Continue reporting during MINIMIZE.

A2.3. Forward AF Form 3594 to HQ USAF/SPX with information copies to HQ AFSPA/SPSD, to arrive not later than 15 January and 15 July each year.

A2.3.1. For sections I and III through VI of the report, indicate authorized and assigned data to support SP mobility (UTCs assigned) or in-place taskings.

A2.3.2. For mobility UTCs, use the logistics detail data to determine number of personnel authorized.

A2.3.3. For in-place units, report what equipment is authorized as determined by the parent MAJCOM.

A2.3.4. For section II, report the number of weapons authorized and assigned in the combat arms training and maintenance section.

A2.3.5. On section VII, report the number of UTCs, as reported in the WMP 3, Part 2.